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INTRODUCTION

Much has been written regarding the economic effects of the federal
estate tax, but relatively little has been published about state inheritance
taxes and their economic consequences.' Additionally, what has been

* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2010; B.A. History and Political Science, magna cum laude, Grove City
College, 2007. The author would like to thank his family for their love and support.
1. One reason for this imbalance is the federal estate tax's role as a major policy
debate. See, e.g., Kathryn L. Moore, Business Law Forum: The Aging of the Baby
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written has not been addressed primarily to a legal audience.2 The legal
literature discussing the Pennsylvania inheritance tax, one of the eleven
effective state inheritance or estate taxes found across the country, is no
exception to this observation; beyond practice guides, few legal
resources have discussed the tax, and virtually none have substantively
and systematically examined its economic effects.4
Furthermore,
Pennsylvania's inheritance tax, like those of other states that have such
taxes, has never been specifically analyzed in a legal context from the
unique perspective of praxeology,5 an economic framework rooted in the

Boomers and America's Changing Retirement System, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 267,
n. 130 (2007) (discussing and citing sources that evidence the debate).
2. Only four articles addressed to a legal audience have been written that generally
mention the economics of state estate or inheritance taxes: Anne L. Alstott, Equal
Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV. L. REv. 469, 496-501 (2007); Jeffrey
A. Cooper, Interstate Competition and State Death Taxes: A Modern Crisis in Historical
Perspective, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 835 (2006); Jeffrey A. Cooper, John R. Ivimey & Donna D.
Vincenti, State Estate Taxes After EGTRRA: A Long Day's Journey into Night, 17
QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 317 (2004); Susan K. Hill, Comment, Leaping Before We Look?:
Repeal of the State Estate Tax Credit and the Consequences for States, Americans, and
the FederalGovernment, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 151, 172-79 (2004).
This lack of literature addressed primarily to a legal audience does not reflect the
value of such analysis to the legal community. The economic analysis of state
inheritance taxes is useful to lawyers for at least two reasons. First, lawyers and, in
particular, law professors have traditionally held positions that enable them to
significantly influence legislation and governmental policy, as evidenced by the
preponderance of persons with law degrees that a) sit in legislatures and in state agencies
and b) participate in policy organizations and state bar associations. If economic effects
are to be considered in the context of legislative purposes, economic analysis of a state's
inheritance tax is likely to be valuable. Second, economic analysis based on praxeology
focuses on the actions of individual persons, who are also lawyers' clients. Thus, beyond
being only an abstract exercise in "the dismal science," an economic examination of state
inheritance taxes also reveals some of the concerns, needs, and even the available options
of the legal profession's clients.
3.

JULIEANNE E. STEINBACHER & ADRIANNE J. STAHL, PENNSYLVANIA TRUST

GUIDE: A HANDBOOK FOR TRUSTEES AND THEIR ADVISORS 525 (2008) (listing states with
effective inheritance or estate taxes as being Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee). See
also Jeffrey A. Cooper, Interstate Competition and State Death Taxes: A Modern Crisis
in HistoricalPerspective, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 835, 877-79 (2006) (listing many of the states
with effective inheritance taxes and discussing how the list of states with effective
inheritance or estate taxes is in flux).
4. State governments have produced some materials regarding their inheritance
taxes.

See, e.g., PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM

REv-1500
(2008),
http://www.revenue.state.pa.us/revenue/lib/revenue/rev-1501.pdf.
These legislative or governmental resources, however, differ in both content and purpose
from legal resources written to inform members of the legal audience about state
inheritance tax issues.
5. The limited legal literature mentioning the praxeological concept of the primacy
of individual action includes: John M. Czametzky, Time, Uncertainty, and the Law of
CorporateReorganizations, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2939 (1999); Gary Lawson, Efficiency
and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53, 58-60 (1992); Timothy Mulligan, Note, In the
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study of individual human action.6 This praxeological approach, with its
recognition of "the market" as the aggregation of the actions and
exchanges of individual persons, provides several significant and
relevant insights into the nature of Pennsylvania's inheritance tax, which
has taken and will likely continue to take various forms.
Thus, after providing a brief introduction of both the history of
Pennsylvania's inheritance tax and praxeology in Parts II and III, this
Comment examines the Pennsylvania inheritance tax 1) in its current
statutory form, 2) as it would have been affected by a recent bill in the
General Assembly, and 3) in the extreme forms possibly permitted by the
case law of both Pennsylvania and the United States Supreme Court. In
Part IV, this Comment outlines the economic effects of each of these
three expressions of Pennsylvania's inheritance tax in four
praxeologically-significant
categories:
ante-mortem
capital
accumulation, ante-mortem capital flight, post-mortem capital
consumption, and state revenue.8 Consistent with praxeology's goal of
serving an exclusively descriptive and educational function that avoids

Context of Homeowner's and Commercial General Liability Insurance Policies, Should
the Issue of Whether an Incident Was an Accident Be Determinedfrom the Insured's or
the Injured Party's Perspective, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 753, n.154 (1996); John K.
Palchak & Stanley T. Leung, No State Required? A Critical Review of the Polycentric
Legal Order, 38 GONZ. L. REv. 289, 302-05 (2002-2003); George Steven Swan, The Law
and Economics of Affirmative Action in Housing: The Diversity Impulse, 15 U. MIAMI
Bus. L. REv. 133, 195 (2006); Joseph Becker, Comment, ProcrusteanJurisprudence:An
Austrian School Economic Critique of the Separation and Regulation of Liberties in the
Twentieth Century United States, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 671, 691-93 (1995); David Baer,
Comment, Establishinga Moral Duty to Obey the Law Through a Jurisprudenceof Law
and Economics, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 491, 507-39 (2007). None of these sources
analyze state inheritance taxes from a praxeological perspective.
6. Praxeology is the general theory of human action; it is an economic system
deduced from the central premise that individual persons act. MURRAY N. ROTHBARD,
MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE: A TREATISE ON ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES, 63 (The Ludwig von

Mises Inst. 2001). See infra Part III (describing praxeology and the economic method for
which it provides the basis).
7. ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 71-80; LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A
TREATISE ON ECONoMICs 257-58 (3d rev. ed. Henry Regnery Co. 1966). Mises defines

the market as
a process, actuated by the interplay of the actions of the various individuals
cooperating under the division of labor. The forces determining thecontinually changing-state of the market are the value judgments of these
individuals and their actions as directed by these value judgments. .. . There is
nothing inhuman or mystical with regard to the market. The market process is
entirely resultant of human actions. Every market phenomenon can be traced
back to definite choices of the members of the market society.
MISES, supra,at 257-58.
8. These four categories are praxeologically significant because they are not
independent of human action. Individuals affect or are affected by all four of these
categories of economic consequences.
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rendering normative policy conclusions,9 this Comment advocates
neither for nor against the Pennsylvania inheritance tax on the level of
public policy.
Rather, in Part V, this Comment discusses the
implications on the inheritance tax debate of the conclusions reached in
Part IV.
II.

ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
INHERITANCE TAX

Pennsylvania's inheritance tax has a long, nearly two-hundred year
history.o Over the course of that history, at least three alternative
formulations of Pennsylvania's inheritance tax are discernible, whether
in actuality or potentiality: 1) in the extensive forms permitted by case
law, 2) as the tax currently stands in statute, and 3) as it was intended to
be phased out by recently proposed legislation before the General
Assembly.11
A.

The Inheritance Tax in Case Law

The history of Pennsylvania's inheritance tax has not been without
conflict, and on numerous occasions the tax has been the subject of
battles in court.12 Despite unfortunate results for at least one party in
each case, these legal clashes have enabled courts to clearly establish the
nature of the Commonwealth's inheritance tax and define its outer
boundaries in more concrete terms.' 3 From the case law, two important
principles stand out with regard to the nature of Pennsylvania's
inheritance tax: 1) the tax differs from the federal estate tax in that it is a
levy against one's statutorily-created privilege to inherit property from a
decedent, and 2) there are no clear or obvious limitations to the extent of
inheritance tax rates.14

9. MISES, supra note 7, at 10.
10. Pennsylvania was the first state to enact an inheritance tax, having done so in
1826 with "an act relating to collateral inheritances."
1825-26 Pa. Laws 227-30.
Pennsylvania's first inheritance tax was levied on property inherited from estates valued
at over $250 by persons other than a decedent's "father, mother, husband, wife, children,
and lineal descendants born in lawful wedlock" at a rate of two and one-half percent. Id.
at 227.
11. See infra Part II.A-C.
12. See infra notes 15 to 31 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Pa., 58 U.S. 456 (1854); In re Estate of Lander, 207 A.2d
753 (Pa. 1965); In re Estate of Pickering, 190 A.2d 132 (Pa. 1963); In re Estate of
Wright, 138 A.2d 102 (Pa. 1958); In re Tack's Estate, 191 A. 155 (Pa. 1937); Shugars v.
Chamberlain Amusement Enters., Inc., 130 A. 426 (Pa. 1925); In re Kirkpatrick's Estate,
119 A. 269 (Pa. 1922); Strode v. Commonwealth, 1866 WL 6214 (Pa. 1866).
14. The former principle is clearly enunciated in Estate of Lander, 207 A.2d at 75556. The latter principle is best illustrated in Tack's Estate, 191 A. at 156.
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The case law outlining the nature of Pennsylvania's inheritance tax
5
begins in 1854 with Carpenter v. Pennsylvania.1
In Carpenter, the
executor of an unsettled estate challenged the retroactive application of
an amendment to Pennsylvania's first inheritance tax law on
constitutional grounds.16 Siding with the Commonwealth's argument for
applying the amendment, the Supreme Court of the United States
concluded that a state has primary control of an inheritance up until the
time of distribution to the inheritors. 1 7 The Court also found that taxing
inheritances constituted a constitutional exercise of such control."
Nearly seventy-five years later, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
clarified the nature of Pennsylvania's inheritance tax in Shugars v.
Chamberlain Amusement Enterprises, Inc.19 In that case, which dealt
with the taxation of inherited life estates and remainders for which the
remaindermen could not immediately be identified, the court established
that under Pennsylvania's direct inheritance tax,
the thing taxed was the right20 of succession or the privilege of
receiving at death the property possessed by the decedent, either by
will or under the intestate laws. The fundamental thought was to levy
a toll against the passing of property of citizens going by reason of
death to others in whatever light the taking may be viewed.21
This description of the Pennsylvania inheritance tax was adopted and
further employed in later cases, including Estate of Lander.2 2 In that
matter, Pennsylvania's Supreme Court echoed language from Shugars
and noted that the inheritance tax "is usually denominated a legacy or
succession tax on the privilege of receiving the property owned by a
decedent."23
Additionally, the court distinguished Pennsylvania's
inheritance tax from the federal estate tax on the basis that the latter was

15.

Carpenter,58 U.S. 456.

16. Id.at459-61.
17. Id. at 463. In articulating this conclusion, the Court stated that "[t]he rights of
the donee are subordinate to the conditions, formalities, and administrative control,
prescribed by the State in the interests of its public order, and are only irrevocably
established upon [the State's] abdication of this control, at the period of distribution." Id.
18. Id. "If the State, during this period of administration and control by its tribunals
and their appointees, thinks fit to impose a tax upon the property, there is no obstacle in
the constitution and laws of the United States to prevent it." Id.
19. Shugars, 130 A. at 426.
20. It is not insignificant that the word "right" was used here. The notion that one
has a right to the succession of property has implications on the inheritance tax rate and a
State's ability to escheat devised property. See infra note 25.
21. Shugars, 130 A. at 427. See also In re Estate of Pickering, 190 A.2d 132, 136
(Pa. 1963) (using the same language to describe the Pennsylvania inheritance tax).
22. In re Estate of Lander, 207 A.2d 753 (Pa. 1965).
23. Id. at 754, 756.
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a tax on a decedent's privilege of transmission rather than the inheritor's
24
privilege of succession.
On its face, the case law also suggests that the privilege of
succession, which was created by the state, is not absolute and can be
withdrawn by the state, perhaps through the use of a high inheritance tax
rate.25 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Kirkpatrick's Estate,
employed the rule that the right or privilege of succession "is purely a
creature of statutory law. It did not exist at common law, and individuals
possess no natural right to such succession; the sovereign authority that
gives it may demand payment for the gift." 26 Building on this principle
fifteen years later in Tack's Estate, the court cast the inheritance tax as
the state's distributive share of an estate, which was based on its
allowing the privilege of inheritance, and could amount up to the entire
value of such estate.27 In drawing this conclusion, the court baldly stated
that
Students of law agree that the state has the right to declare an escheat
of all the property of a decedent and therefore, as the price of
24. Id. at 755-56. The court noted that
"it is well settled that the Federal Estate tax is not a legacy tax or a succession
tax on the privilege of receiving the property possessed by a decedent; instead
it is a tax on the privilege of transmission of decedent's property (i.e., the
statutory net estate of the decedent) which is payable out of the estate as a
whole."
Id. at 756 (quoting In re Estate of Pickering, 190 A.2d at 136-37).
25. While the case law is relatively unambiguous in claiming as the state's
prerogative the power to eliminate the privilege of succession, any state attempt to that
effect would be met with substantial legal challenges. For example, a "dispossessed" heir
would likely argue that an inheritance tax rate that eliminates an inheritance effectively
serves as an unconstitutional government taking, citing as support the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). Conversely, the state
would likely argue that the Court's decision in Hodel narrowly protects the right of
transmission, and thus a state inheritance tax that abolishes the privilege of succession
does not violate the United States Constitution. In response, the heir would likely assert
that such a formalistic distinction ignores the fact that a confiscatory tax on either the
right of transmission or the right of succession leads to the same result, being two sides of
the same coin.
26. In re Kirkpatrick's Estate, 119 A. 269, 269 (Pa. 1922) (citing Magoun v. Illinois
Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 290 (1898)). See also Strode v. Commonwealth,
1866 WL 6214 (Pa. 1866), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court quoted from lower
court:
[Als the right to take by succession and testament is derived from the state, it
must necessarily be enjoyed subject to such conditions as the state may impose.
And if a condition be that the kindred or legatees shall pay a bonus, this is not a
tax or burthen imposed on their property, or on the property of anybody else. It
is simply the price of the privilege which the state has conferred upon them. If
they do not choose to avail themselves of the privilege they need not pay the
price, and are no worse off than before.
Strode, 1866 WL 6214, at *3.
27. In re Tack's Estate, 191 A. 155, 156 (Pa. 1937).
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allowing a legatee, devisee, or heir to inherit, it may appropriate to
itself any portion of the property which it chooses to exact. 28

The United States Supreme Court echoed this conclusion in Irving
Trust Company v. Day, when it held that "[n]othing in the Federal
Constitution forbids the legislature of a state to limit, condition, or even
abolish the power of testamentary disposition over property within its
jurisdiction."2 9
In his dissenting opinion in Estate of Wright, Justice John C. Bell
summed up what case law has indicated is the extent of Pennsylvania's
power to tax inheritances:
The law is well settled that beneficiaries of a decedent's estate
(whether by will or descent) have no natural or vested right to

receive such property; on the contrary, whatever rights such
beneficiaries possess are derived from and governed by statute and
consequently the beneficiaries take under and subject to the
applicable statutes. Unfortunately, it is established law that a State
may validly escheat all of a decedent's net estate and such action
would violate neither the United States nor the Pennsylvania
Constitutions. 30

On its face, the case law provides no clear and obvious limitations on
Pennsylvania's ability to levy an inheritance tax with a rate of up to one

hundred percent of inherited property.
B.

The Inheritance Tax as Currently in Statute

Pennsylvania's inheritance tax, in its current statutory form, is
presented in a logical sequence that introduces the tax, defines what
inherited property will be taxed, establishes the rate of the tax, and
provides the procedures for administering the tax.32 The statute includes
detailed instructions on valuing assets, collecting the tax, receiving tax
payments, distributing refunds, and resolving disputes. At the heart of
the inheritance tax statutes are those sections dealing with the types of
transferred property that will be taxed and the rates at which such
28. Id. But see supra note 25. The court's blanket claim that the state can escheat
all of a decedent's property may no longer be true in light of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Hodel, 481 U.S. 704. The legitimacy of such a "tax" would likely
need to rest on a) the distinction between a tax on the right of transmission and one on the
privilege of succession and b) the Court's explicit recognition of prior cases validating
state inheritance taxing powers.
29. Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942).
30. In re Estate of Wright, 138 A.2d 102, 115 (Pa. 1958) (Bell, J. dissenting).
31. See supra notes 12-30 and accompanying text.
32. 72 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9101-9196 (West 2008).
33. Id. §§ 9121-9122, 9136-9154, 9166-9188.
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property will be taxed.34 Pennsylvania's inheritance tax adopts a broad,
all-encompassing approach in taxing all property35 transferred by will,
intestate statute, and court order,3 6 as well as all specified property
transfers made during either a resident or nonresident's lifetime for
which valuable and adequate consideration was not received at the time
of transfer. 3 The inheritance tax is also applied to "[a]ll succeeding
interests which follow the interest of a surviving spouse in a trust or
similar arrangement" to the extent that the decedent-spouse's personal
representative has not elected to have such interests treated as if
transferred by the surviving spouse.38 In addition, property passing to a
non-spouse by virtue of a joint tenancy interest is also taxed as inherited
property. 39 To determine the amount attributable to an inherited portion,
the value of the whole property is divided by the number of joint tenants
living or in existence immediately preceding the death of the decedent.40
The value of estate assets is calculated as of the date of death, with
special formulas employed for valuing interests such as life estates,
future interests, etc. 41 The statute includes a limitation on the valuation
of farmland by allowing inherited land "devoted to agricultural use,
agricultural reserve or forest reserve," as specifically defined by statute,
to be valued only in light of that particular use.42
34. Id. §§ 9106-9116. Section 9106 formally establishes Pennsylvania's inheritance
tax in broadly stating that "[a]n inheritance tax for the use of the Commonwealth is
imposed upon every transfer subject to tax under this article at the rates specified in
section [9116]." Id. § 9106 (West 2008). These inheritance tax provisions are
particularly relevant to praxeological analysis because of their direct effect on an
individual's finances; the determination of what inherited property is taxed and at what
rate fundamentally affects individuals who prospectively consider the disposition of their
estates, which subsequently influences their economic decisions.
35. Id. § 9107(a).
36. Id. § 9107(b).
37. Id. § 9107(c). Among the property interests taxed under this subsection are
property with a value greater than $3,000 transferred within a year before the decedent's
death; property in which the transferor held a reversionary interest; property in which the
transferor maintained a right to designate who may possess or enjoy such property;
property for which the transferor was to receive interest or support for the remainder of
his life (i.e. annuities); and property over which the decedent had, within one year of
death, the power to alter, amend, or revoke the interest of a beneficiary (i.e. retirement
funds and trusts). Id. § 9107(c).
38. Id. §§ 9107(d), 9113.
39. Id. § 9108(a).
40. Id. This approach differs from the federal estate tax approach. 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 2040 (West 2008) (providing the federal rules regarding the estate taxation of joint
tenancy property).
41. 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 9121 (West 2008).
42. Id. § 9122. If, however, the property is used for different purposes within seven
years after the decedent's death, the owner of the land will become liable for the
difference between the value of the land as it was valued for a particular use and the
value of the land using general valuation methods. Id. § 9122(c).
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Despite its broad reach, the Pennsylvania inheritance tax
specifically excludes from taxation certain types of inherited property
and allows a decedent's estate to take statutorily-identified deductions.43
For example, transfers to governmental bodies, charities, fraternal
societies, and veterans' organizations are excluded from taxation.44
Likewise, among other excluded property are insurance proceeds,
intangible property of nonresidents, escheated property, and spousal
property obtained by right of survivorship.45 Lump-sum burial or death
payments from the Social Security Administration, Veterans'
Administration, or United States Railroad Retirement Board are also not
included in a decedent's estate.46 Also excluded are payments under
pension, stock bonus, profit-sharing, and other retirement plans where
the decedent, before his death, "did not otherwise have the right to
possess (including proprietary rights at termination of employment),
enjoy, assign or anticipate the payment made." 47 From the total value of
an estate, an executor may also deduct reasonable administration costs,
bequests to attorneys or fiduciaries in lieu of fees, the family exemption,
funeral and burial expenses, the cost of tombstones or gravemarkers,
contributions to burial trusts, payments made for burial contracts,
bequests for religious services. 4 8 Property taxes, non-federal death taxes
paid to other states or nations, 4 9 and several forms of debt owed to others
by the decedent's estate may also be deducted.so
The inheritance tax applies four different tax rates, each to property
transferred to persons standing in certain relationships with the
decedent.5 ' Currently, property that is transferred to a spouse is taxed at
a rate of zero percent. 52 Property inherited from a decedent's estate by a
grandparent, parent, lineal descendant, or spouse of a child is taxed at a
rate of four and one-half percent.
A tax rate of twelve percent is
43. Id. §§9111-9113,9126-9130.
44. Id. § 9111(b)-(c). These exclusions are allowed, based on the assumption that
the inherited property will be used for governmental, charitable, educational, or
organizational purposes, with further restrictions being based on the organizational status
of the intended beneficiary. Id.
45. Id. § 9111(d),(h),(k)-(m).
46. Id. § 9111(p)-(q).
47. 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 9111(r) (West 2008).
48. Id. § 9127.
49. Id. § 9128.
50. Id. § 9129.
51. 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 9116(a) (West 2008).
52. Id. § 9116(a)(1.1)(ii). The inherited property taxed at this rate also includes
property transferred as a result of a spouse's exercise of elective share rights under 20 PA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2201-2211 (West 2008).
53. Id. § 9116(a)(1). Under § 9116(a)(1.2), a special exclusion is applied to property
inherited by parents from decedent-children under the age of twenty-one, which is taxed
at a zero percent rate. Id. § 9116(a)(1.2).
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applied to property transferred to siblings. 54 The highest rate, fifteen
percent, is reserved for property inherited by persons or entities in all
other relationships, known as collaterals.s
C.

ProposedLegislation to GraduallyRepeal the Inheritance Tax

A recent attempt56 to alter Pennsylvania's inheritance tax came in
November 2007, with an amendment to House Bill 37757 submitted by
Representative Scott Perry (R) of the 92nd Legislative District.
Intended to phase out Pennsylvania's inheritance tax completely by
2012, the amendment would have steadily decreased inheritance tax rates
to zero percent for property inherited from decedents who die in
particular years. 59 In addition, the amendment sought to add an
additional provision that would have immediately applied a tax rate of
zero percent to property transferred to a decedent's parent, adoptive
parent, or stepparent. 60 The amendment did not attempt to redefine
taxable property or provide additional exclusions, deductions, or

54. Id. § 9116(a)(1.3).
55. Id. § 9116(a)(2).
56. Other recent attempts are H.R. 635, 191st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009);
H.R. 423, 191st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009); H.R. 374, 191st Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Pa. 2009); S. 80, 191st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009); H.R. 1444, 190th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); H.R. 808, 190th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); H.R.
836, 190th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); S. 417, 190th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Pa. 2007); and H.R. 409, 190th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007).
57. House Bill 377 originally sought only to amend Pennsylvania's tax code by
adding an "alternative special tax provision for poverty." The General Assembly of
Pennsylvania, House Bill No. 377, Printer's No. 441 (Feb. 13, 2007),
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/CFDOCS/Legis/PN/Public/btCheck.cfm?txtType=PDF&sess
Yr-2007&sesslnd=0&billBody-H&billTyp=B&billNbr-0377&pn=0441 (amended by
House Bill No. 377, Printer's No. 2809).
58. Pennsylvania Legislative Reference Bureau, Amendments of House Bill No.
377, Amendment 04399, (November 21, 2007), http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/
billinfo/split.cfm?syear-2007&sind=0&body=H&type=B&bn=0377&pn=2849&ayear-2
007&an=04399.
59. Id. The amendment would have kept the tax rate for spousal transfers at its
current, zero percent rate. Id. For grandparents, parents, lineal descendants, and the
spouses of children, the amendment would have kept the tax rate at four and one-half
percent for inheritances received from a decedent's estate who died before 2010, but
would have decreased this rate to two percent for inheritances received from decedents'
estates who died in 2010 and further reduced it to zero percent for inheritances received
from decedents' estates who died after 2010. Id. Tax rates on inheritances to siblings
would be reduced from twelve percent in 2007 to nine percent in 2008, to six percent in
2009, to four and one-half percent in 2010, to two percent in 2011, and finally to zero
percent in 2012 and every year thereafter. Id. For all other transfers, the amendment
would have reduced the tax rate from fifteen percent in 2007 to ten percent in 2008, and
then to seven percent in 2009, after which the tax rate would parallel the rate for transfers
to siblings. Id.
60. Id.
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credits. 6 1 After some debate 62 and with the support of an overwhelming
majority of both Democrats and Republicans, the amendment was
adopted by a vote of 173-23 in January 2008. On the following day,
the bill was passed by a vote of 191-0 and submitted to the Senate for
concurrence.6
Once in the Senate, House Bill 377 was referred to the Committee
on Finance at the end of January 2008.
In committee, the sections
intended to repeal the Pennsylvania inheritance tax, along with most
other provisions, were stripped from the bill as a result of an amendment
submitted by Senator Patrick M. Browne (R) of the 16th Senatorial
District.66 After additional referrals to the Senate committees on Finance
and Appropriations, House Bill 377 was unanimously passed by the
Senate and approved by Governor Edward Rendell in July 2008.67
Although the provisions that would have gradually repealed the
inheritance tax were deleted before the passage of House Bill 377,
those provisions are significant for several reasons, all of which warrant
an analysis of the proposed legislation. First, that Representative Perry
submitted his amendment, which received widespread support in the
diaieo
House, 69 is indicative
of the perennial nature of discussions regarding the

6 1.

Id.

62. The General Assembly of Pennsylvania, Legislative Journal-House 82-84
(January 16, 2008), http://www.legis. state.pa.us/WIU01/LI/HJ/2008/0/20080116.pdf.
63. Id.
64. The General Assembly of Pennsylvania, Legislative Journal-House 120 (January
17, 2008), http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/HJ/2008/0/20080117.pdf; The General
Assembly of Pennsylvania, House Bill No. 377, Printer's No. 3094 (Jan. 16, 2008),
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/CFDOCS/Legis/PN/Public/btCheck.cfm?txtType=PDF&sess
Yr=2007&sesslnd=0&billBody=H&billTyp=B&billNbr=0377&pn=3094 (amended by
House Bill No. 377, Printer's No. 4086).
65. The General Assembly of Pennsylvania, Legislative Journal-Senate 1533
(January 28, 2008), http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/SJ/2008/0/Sj20080128.pdf.
66. Pennsylvania Legislative Reference Bureau, Amendments of House Bill No.
377, Amendment 08080, (June 26, 2008) (on file with committee chairman); The General
Assembly of Pennsylvania, House Bill No. 377, Printer's No. 4086 (Jun. 26, 2008),
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/CFDOCS/Legis/PN/PublicbtCheck.cfm?txtType=PDF&sess
Yr-2007&sesslnd=0&billBody=H&billTyp=B&billNbr=0377&pn-4086 (amended by
House Bill No. 377, Printer's No. 4195).
67. The General Assembly of Pennsylvania, Legislative Journal-Senate 2412 (Jul. 4,
2008), http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/SJ/2008/0/Sj20080704.pdf.
House Bill
377, on final passage by the Senate and approval by the governor, allowed for the study
of a special credit for poverty, the inclusion of a voluntary contribution checkbox on the
Pennsylvania income tax return, and the creation of a tax credit to encourage the
recruitment and retention of volunteer emergency responders. H.R. 377, 192nd Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2008).
68. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
69. The General Assembly of Pennsylvania, Legislative Journal-House 84 (January
16, 2008), http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/HJ/2008/0/20080116.pdf.
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inheritance tax. 0 Second, the removal of the inheritance tax provisions
by the Senate Committee on Finance 7 reflects the ongoing, controversial
nature of any plan to repeal Pennsylvania's inheritance tax.72 Thus, a
praxeological examination of the inheritance tax is useful in evaluating
the assumptions or oftentimes convoluted economic analysis surrounding
the tax, which will likely, in turn, shed light on the rhetoric employed by
all sides in the ongoing debate. Third, proposed legislation seeking to
eliminate the inheritance tax,74 like Representative Perry's amendment to
House Bill 377, serves as a useful and realistic construct with which to
compare alternative formulations of Pennsylvania's inheritance tax, with
the objective being to ascertain the economic effects of each.
III. PRAXEOLOGY AS ECONOMIC THEORY

An entire system of economic thought has been derived from
praxeology, which is the general study of human action.76 Praxeology
provides a universal theory of human action by defining the relationship
between ends and means in individual decision-making,n thus
distinguishing itself from other disciplines.7 1 Praxeology begins with the
70. Evidence of ongoing discontent with the inheritance tax is revealed in the other,
numerous attempts to repeal the inheritance tax. See e.g., H.R. 1444, 190th Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); H.R. 808, 190th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); H.R. 836,
190th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); S. 417, 190th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa.
2007); and H.R. 409, 190th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007).
71. Pennsylvania Legislative Reference Bureau, Amendments of House Bill No.
377, Amendment 08080, (June 26, 2008) (on file with committee chairman); The General
Assembly of Pennsylvania, House Bill No. 377, Printer's No. 4086 (Jun. 26, 2008),
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/CFDOCS/Legis/PN/Public/btCheck.cfn?txtType=PDF&sess
Yr-2007&sesslnd=0&billBody=H&billTyp=B&billNbr-0377&pn=4086 (amended by
House Bill No. 377, Printer's No. 4195).
72. See supra note 70 (providing evidence of the controversy generated by
Pennsylvania's inheritance tax).
73. See infra Parts IV-V.
74. See, e.g., supra note 56 (providing examples of recent legislation attempting to
repeal Pennsylvania's inheritance tax).
75. Pennsylvania Legislative Reference Bureau, Amendments of House Bill No.
377, Amendment 04399, (November 21, 2007), http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/
billinfo/split.cfm?syear-2007&sind=0&body=H&type=B&bn=0377&pn=2849&ayear-2
007&an=04399.
76. LUDWIG VON MISES, THE ULTIMATE FOUNDATION OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE: AN
ESSAY ON METHOD 41-44 (1962).
77. ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 63.
78. Id. at 63-64. Praxeology examines "the formal implications of the fact that men
use means to attain various chosen ends." Id. at 64. It does not analyze "the subjective
decisions of individual human minds" or the specific content of a person's ends. Id. at
63. Therefore, praxeology is distinguished from psychology (why people chooses
various ends), the philosophies of ethics and aesthetics (what people's ends should be),
technology (how to use means to arrive at ends), and history (what man's ends are and
have been, and how man has used means in order to attain those ends). Id. at 64.
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axiom that individuals 79 act, denoting that they apply means according to
an idea to achieve ends.80 Thus, individuals act purposefully; their
actions are rational" in the sense that they are aimed at particular
objectives.82 Inherent in this description is the fact that individuals act in
time.83 They apply means in the present according to their currently-held
ideas to achieve ends in the future, however near or distant.84
From these initial premises, the rest of praxeological principles are
For example, that individuals act in time
syllogistically deduced.
implies that they seek to increase their satisfaction; specifically, an
individual applies means in the present according to a currently-held idea
to achieve a future end that will be more satisfactory than either his
Thus, an
present circumstances or his predicted future state. 86
individual's anticipated future satisfaction is based entirely on his
subjective preferences, and the preferences that motivate one person to

79. A central concept of praxeology is methodological individualism. Id. at 2.
Methodological individualism recognizes that only individuals are capable of action and,
thus, the study of human action must necessarily focus on individuals. Id. Neither
praxeology nor methodological individualism contests the fact that collective bodies have
significantly influenced history and will continue to do so. Id. However, both point out
that collective bodies operate "always through the intermediary of one or several
individuals whose actions are related to the collective as the secondary source," with an
appropriate incorporation of this fact into their methodology. MISES, supra note 7, at 4143.
80. MISES, supra note 7, at 11; ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 1-11, 14-17.
81. As used here, the term "rational" refers to the quality of being purposeful, of
being aimed at the attainment of particular ends. It is not an evaluation of the
appropriateness of the ends that individuals seek; praxeology is incapable of making
normative judgments because it lacks a framework of values, which is necessary to make
such assertions. MISES, supra note 7, at 19-22.
82. ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 1.
83. MISES, supra note 7, at 99-104; ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 11-14.
84. ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 2.
85. Murray Rothbard, In Defense of Extreme Apriorism, 23 S. ECON. J. 314-20
(1957).
86. MISES, supra note 7, at 13-14, 100. Mises describes this principle in the
following manner:
Action is always directed toward the future; it is essentially and necessarily
always a planning and acting for a better future. Its aim is always to render
future conditions more satisfactory than they would be without the interference
of action. The uneasiness that impels a man to act is caused by a dissatisfaction
with expected future conditions as they would probably develop if nothing
were done to alter them. In any case action can influence only the future, never
the present that with every infinitesimal fraction of a second sink down into the
past. Man becomes conscious of time when he plans to convert a less
satisfactory present state into a more satisfactory future state.
Id.

1118

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 114:3

act in a particular way may be wholly insufficient to induce another
person to act in the same manner for identical purposes."
An additional corollary is the concept of time preference, which
recognizes that the personal preference for a particular present
gratification over an anticipated future satisfaction8 8 differs by degrees
for all individuals.8 9 For example, Anne may be willing to forego a trip
to the bar with her law school friends because she prefers the better grade
that she anticipates receiving by using her time in the present to study.
Bob, on the other hand, would much rather spend a night out with
friends, preferring socializing in the present to any anticipated grade
benefits that would result from studying.
Assuming, perhaps
unrealistically, that both Anne and Bob are equally efficient in their use
of study time, Anne has a lower time preference and Bob has a higher
time preference at the point they each choose to act (e.g., studying or
going to the bar).90
The concept of time preference is closely linked with saving and
investing.91 Given the general preference of all persons for present
consumption over future satisfaction, with all other things being equal,
no one would be willing to forego spending $100 for gratification in the
present only to have $100 at a later date.92 This wisdom is implicit in the
notion of the time value of money, and only when other considerations
(i.e., deflation, future financial security, the ability to provide
inheritances, financial power, etc.) enter the picture would this
transaction even begin to be entertained as a viable course of action.
Under the same circumstances, however, some individuals will likely be
more willing to forego spending $100 for gratification in the present to
have $105 and the consumption it would represent at a later date.
Likewise, even more individuals will likely be willing to postpone

87. MURRAY ROTHBARD, THE LOGIC OF HUMAN ACTION ONE 59-60 (Edward Elgar
1997); ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 323-33.

88. It is logically inconceivable that a person could have an absolute preference for
future consumption over present gratification. ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 3-6. Mises
also makes this point in stating that
[i]f [a man] were not to prefer satisfaction in a nearer period of the future to
that in a remoter period, he would never consume and so satisfy wants. He
would always accumulate, he would never consume and enjoy. He would not
consume today, but he would not consume tomorrow either, as the morrow
would confront him with the same alternative.
MISES, supra note 7, at 484.
89. MISEs, supra note 7, at 483-88.
See id. (noting the definition and relevance of time preference to human action).
ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 482, 488.
MISES, supra note 7, at 486.
ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 13-17 (laying out the implications of value scales
and time preferences).
90.

91.
92.
93.
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spending $100 in the present to have $120 in the future. 94 Those with
higher time preferences would require greater "returns" on their
investments to motivate them to save, and subsequently invest, when
compared to persons with lower time preferences.9 5
This fact of individual action reflects a central principle of
praxeological analysis: marginality.9 6 The principle of marginality
recognizes that individuals have infinitely varying, ordinarily-ranked
preferences and the resulting value scales.97 As a result of this variation,
98
some individuals will always be on the "margin" of any given decision.
Individuals, subjectively weighing the perceived costs against the
anticipated benefits, will decide whether to act based on their unique,99
all-encompassing, personal value scales.100 Thus, when the costs or
benefits of making any given decision to act or not act change, there will
be persons on the "margin" who change their actions as a result.101
Changes in the costs or benefits of an action expressed in terms of
money, which is the primary medium of exchange,10 2 have a particularly
apparent effect on individual decisions that serve to identify those
persons who, in having acted, were doing so on the "margin." 03
Indelibly linked to the saving and investing of persons on the
''margin" are the creation of capital goods and the derivative concept of
capital.10 4 Capital goods are assets, necessarily created with past labor
and time, that are not consumed, but rather are reserved for future
production or consumption.' 05 Thus, capital goods represent stored
labor, assets, and time. 06 Capital goods are also a necessary factor in
expanding and lengthening the production structure, which enables
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. MISES, supra note 7, at 119-27. See also ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 17-28
(discussing the centrality of marginal utility to praxeological analysis).
97. MISES, supra note 7, at 119-23; ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 18-20.
98. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
99. Properly understood, personal value scales are each entirely unique. That many
individuals prefer chocolate cake over pumpkin pie, and vice versa, does not itself
suggest, let alone prove, that persons have identical value scales. First, even with regard
to the choice between chocolate cake and pumpkin pie, there are varying degrees of
preference. Second, personal value scales take into account the totality of all one's
preferences, which are largely based on one's personality and experiences. Given the
uniqueness of personalities and experiences, the uniqueness of value scales logically
follows. MISES, supra note 7, at 119-23.
100. See generally MISES, supra note 7, at 119-23.
101. See id. at 119-27.
102. ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 165. See also MISES, supra note 7, at 208-9, 462-66
(describing the role of money as a medium of exchange).
103. See MISES, supra note 7, at 119-27.
104. Id. at 41-44.
105. Id. at 490-93.
106. Id. at 493.
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production of ever more complex, yet oftentimes more efficient,
practical, and desirable goods.' 07 The production of capital goods,
however, requires saving and investing; 08 if all goods, including assets,
are consumed in the present, there, by implication, will be nothing left
for use in the future.1 09 The concept of capital refers to capital assets,
which includes money, that has been saved and invested and is being or
will be applied to future production." 0 When the current amount of
capital in a society is compared with the amount of capital at a prior
point in time, three possible trends are discernible:
1) capital
consumption, a decrease in the amount of capital; 2) capital maintenance,
no change in the amount of capital; and 3) capital accumulation, an
increase in the amount of capital."1 These trends, in most cases, have a
direct relationship with economic growth;1 2 societies where capital
consumption occurs have a decline in economic production and,
correspondingly, standards of living," 3 while societies in which there is
capital accumulation experience economic growth and realize improved
standards of living.114
An additional principle of praxeology, implicit in the concept of
time preference," 5 is the recognition that in acting in the present,
individuals have the capability to take into account both the short term
and the long term; individuals are able to act while taking into
consideration the anticipated short term and long term effects of their
actions.
A corollary to this principle is that governments, as entities
whose "activities" are, in the most fundamental sense, comprised of the

107. Id. at 259-60, 490-92.
108. Once again, saving and investing is a function of an individual's value scale and
is restricted or encouraged by one's time preference. Id. at 491.
109. MISES, supra note 7, at 259, 490-92.
110. ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 40-61, 486-91.
111. MISES, supra note 7, at 514-17.
112. The term "growth" is used in the descriptive sense only and is not intended to
imply any value judgments. Indeed, one's normative or ethical commitments may reject
economic growth and require individuals to discourage it. See generally Richard
Douthwaite, The Foundation for the Economics of Stability, The Problem with Economic
Growth, http://www.feasta.org/growth.htm (last visited January 26, 2009). See also
ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 832-39 (arguing that endorsement of economic growth is a
matter of policy that necessarily involves value judgments).
113. Like the term "growth, the terms "decline" and "standard of living" are used in
the descriptive sense only and are not intended to imply any value judgments. See
Douthwaite, supra note 94 (making the same observation about the use of the term
"growth").
114. ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 479-91. These economic results follow from the
availability of capital, which enables future production, in society. Id.
115. See generally supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
116. ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 40-61, 305-07.
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can also take into consideration of both

the short term and long term effects of their policies."

8

These principles do not constitute the entirety of praxeology,ll 9 but
they do provide the basic elements necessary for outlining the four
praxeologically-significant
categories
which are affected by
Pennsylvania's inheritance tax: ante-mortem capital consumption, antemortem capital flight, post-mortem capital consumption, and state

revenue. 12 0
IV.

A PRAXEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
INHERITANCE TAX

Using these praxeological principles, it is not only possible, but also
profitable, 12 1 to determine the economic effects of Pennsylvania's
inheritance tax in its three different formulations. 1 22 Given their
variation, each of these will have different economic effects, even if only
to a matter of degree, with regard to the four praxeologicallysignificant1 2 3 categories of ante-mortem capital consumption, ante-

117. MISES, supra note 7, at 41-44. See also supra note 64 (explaining the principle
of methodological individualism). In discussing methodological individualism, Mises
aptly makes this point:
First we must realize that all actions are performed by individuals. A collective
operates always through the intermediary of one or several individuals whose
actions are related to the collective as a secondary source. It is the meaning
which the acting individuals and all those who are touched by their action
attribute to an action, that determines its character. It is the meaning that marks
one action as the action of an individual and another action as the action of the
state or of the municipality. The hangman, not the state, executes a criminal. It
is the meaning of those concerned that discerns in the hangman's action an
action of the state . . . . The life of a collective is lived in the actions of the
individuals constituting its body . . . . That there are nations, states, and

churches, that there is social cooperation under the division of labor, becomes
discernible only in the actions of certain individuals.
MISES, supra note 7, at 42-43.
118. ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 40-61, 652-54.
119. For a more complete analysis of praxeology and the economic principles derived
from it, see generally MISES, supra note 7; ROTHBARD, supra note 6; and other works by
scholars affiliated with the Austrian School of Economics.
120. Each of these categories is praxeologically-significant because each is primarily
affected by the actions of individual persons. Thus, in turn, inheritance taxes, which
affect individual action, consequently affect these four categories.
121. Recognizing the economic effects of Pennsylvania's inheritance tax is useful in
informing and defining the contours of the debate. See infra Part V (highlighting the
implications that praxeological principles have on the discussion of Pennsylvania's
inheritance tax).
122. See supra Part II (defining the three different formulations of Pennsylvania's
inheritance tax).
123. See supra Part III (outlining the principles of praxeology).
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mortem capital flight, post-mortem capital consumption, and state

revenue.124
A.

Ante-Mortem Capital Consumption

Given the lack of clear or obvious limitations on Pennsylvania
inheritance tax rates,12 5 the General Assembly could potentially increase
rates to comparatively high levels, even including rates of seventy-five
percent or more. 126 Such a course of legislative action would not be
without severe economic consequences.' 27 For example, high inheritance
tax rates would profoundly increase ante-mortem capital consumption.12 8
Among the many reasons that people save money and other property
during their lifetimes is to provide inheritances to be distributed upon
death to their families, friends, and favored causes.12 9
Persons
3
0
internally weigh'31 the perceived benefits of spending their money or
using their property in the present against the satisfaction each
individually anticipates in both the present and future as a result of
planning to provide inheritances. Of relevance to such determinations is
the size of the expected inheritance to be given. If much of the
satisfaction in granting inheritances comes from the knowledge that
one's heirs or devisees will likely be made financially secure or afforded
expanded opportunities after one has passed, the amount of the
inheritance would affect the overall satisfaction realized by the saver. As
the size of the inheritance increases, the likelihood of these goals being
achieved after death increases, which also increases the satisfaction from
present planning and saving. When individuals save for the purpose of
providing inheritances, their savings will subsequently be invested.132
124. See infra Part IV.A-D (examining the economic effects of each formulation).
125. See supra Part II.A (concluding that there are no clear limitations on the rates
imposed under the Commonwealth's inheritance tax).
126. This could easily be accomplished by simple legislative fiat with the approval of
legislation amending 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 9116(a), which designates the inheritance tax
rates, by a majority of the General Assembly's members in each chamber.
127. See infra notes 128-47 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 139-47 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., The General Assembly of Pennsylvania, Legislative Journal-House 83
(January 16, 2008), http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WUO/LI/HJ/2008/0/20080116.pdf.
130. This process is usually not a conscious, cognitive decision, as with most choices.
However, humans are neither lightning-fast calculators nor creatures trapped by
impulsive urges. They make rational decisions based on their individual subjective,
relative preferences at particular moments in time. MISES, supra note 7, at 19-22.
131. The concept of opportunity cost is at work when individuals analyze the costs
and the benefits of their alternative options. In considering a particular course of action,
the opportunity cost in each situation is the anticipated benefits of the next-best,
alternative option. MuRRAY N. ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 299.
132. Even if an individual does not invest his money or property directly, such assets
will be indirectly invested, in the absence of actual, physical hoarding. When assets are
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Thus, these assets will be added to the total capital stock available in the
market, for which society will accrue the resulting economic benefits. 33
Should Pennsylvania's inheritance tax rates be legislatively
increased to high levels,13 4 the direct result would be to substantially
decrease the perceived benefits of saving to provide inheritances for heirs
and devisees by considerably decreasing the amount of property
transferred and, therefore, sapping the anticipated benefits of saving up
inheritances.
This, in turn, decreases the opportunity cost of
"consuming" assets in the present, making it a more attractive option,
which is even more applicable for those persons with higher time
preferences.' 35 Raising inheritance tax rates to extremely high levels
would change the internal cost-benefit analysis of many individuals to a
considerable extent. As a result, many more people would be rendered
on the "margin" of the choice between saving to provide inheritances and

spending in the present for personal satisfaction.13 6 Given this altered

used to purchase debt instruments or deposited with a bank, broker, or other financial
institution, they are indirectly invested in other business enterprises. In this way, such
assets are still added to the total capital stock available in the market.
133. See infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
134. Given the lack of unambiguous limitations on the General Assembly's ability to
increase the inheritance tax, increasing Pennsylvania's inheritance tax rates to levels in
excess of seventy-five percent is not beyond the realm of possibility. See supra Part II.A.
135. Implicit in this reasoning is the assumption that saving assets to provide financial
security and increased opportunities to heirs and devisees and spending assets for
immediate gratification are, respectively, an individual's primary and secondary
preferences (i.e. that personal financial security or retention of perceived power are, at
best, only tertiary considerations). If an individual's primary preference is to consume in
the present, taxation of inheritances will only serve to strengthen the dominance of that
preference. It is not merely an unrealistic assumption made for the sake of structured
analysis that there exist persons with the value scale mentioned above. First, there are
those individuals who have a secure income apart from the acquisition, saving, and
investment of assets and lack any pretensions of power based on net worth. Second, as
some individuals increase in age and decline in health, their perception of the security
and power benefits linked with accumulated assets declines. These people recognize the
relatively limited timeframe in which they will be able to benefit from their accumulated
assets. If providing inheritances were not the primary consideration for many of these
people, they would have more incentives to plan to die insolvent or spend their last dollar
on the day they die. Thus, there are necessarily those persons whose primary preference
is (or in the future will become) saving to establish inheritances for family, friends, and
favorite causes.
136. Praxeology questions the validity of attempting to predict economic effects with
mathematical exactitude. MuRRAY ROTHBARD, THE LOGIC OF HUMAN ACTION ONE 60-69
(Edward Elgar 1997). Mises also makes this point:
Praxeological knowledge makes it possible to predict with apodictic certainty
the outcome of various modes of action. But, of course, such prediction can
never imply anything regarding quantitative matters. Quantitative problems are
in the field of human action open to no other elucidation than that by
understanding.
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internal calculus, many individuals will choose to spend rather than
save, 13 7 a problem which is only exacerbated as the tax rates applied to
property inherited by classes of intended legatees or heirs increases. 1 38
Such a significant shift in preferences away from saving would
substantially increase capital consumption by individuals who would
otherwise have saved to provide inheritances.' 39
Significant increases in capital consumption resulting from high
inheritance tax rates would have severe economic consequences. 140 In
We can predict ... that-other things being equal-a fall in the demand for a
will result in a drop in the price of a. But we cannot predict the extent of this
drop ....
The fundamental deficiency implied in every quantitative approach to
economic problems consists in the neglect of the fact that there are no constant
relations between what are called economic dimensions. There is neither
constancy nor continuity in the valuations and in the formation of exchange
ratios between various commodities. Every new datum brings about a
reshuffling of the whole price structure. [Praxeological] [u]nderstanding, by
trying to grasp what is going on the minds of men concerned, can approach the
problem of forecasting future conditions.
We may call its method
unsatisfactory and the positivists may arrogantly scorn it. But such arbitrary
judgments must not and cannot obscure the fact that [praxeological]
understanding is the only appropriate method of dealing with the uncertainty of
future conditions.
MISES, supra note 7, at 117-18.
137. The only alternatives are not between not saving at all and saving a particular
amount. There are also degrees between those two, opposite choices that could result
from one's perception of the costs and benefits associated with saving to leave an
inheritance. For example, someone who, absent the inheritance tax, might have intended
to save $100,000 for her siblings to inherit might only save $50,000 as a consequence of
the inheritance tax.
138. Pennsylvania currently has a graduated inheritance structure that imposes a
higher rate on property inherited by persons in a particular class, as defined in relation to
the decedent. 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 9116(a) (West 2008). In light of this present
structure, it is reasonable to conclude the likelihood that Pennsylvania's inheritance tax
will continue to be graduated, even if at much higher rates.
139. MISES, supra note 7, at 490-93, 520-23.
As soon as those present wants are sated and the satisfaction of which is
considered more urgent than any provision for the morrow, people begin to
save a part of the available supply of consumers' goods for later use. This
postponement of consumption makes it possible to direct action toward
temporally remoter ends. It is now feasible to aim at goals which could not be
thought of before on account of the length of the period of production required.
It is furthermore feasible to choose methods of production in which the output
of products is greater per unit of input than in other methods requiring a shorter
period of production. The sine qua non of any lengthening of the processes of
production adopted is saving, i.e., an excess of current production over current
consumption. Saving is the first step on the way toward improvement of
material well-being and toward every further progress on this way.
Id. at 490.
140. The economic effects would likely be serious, regardless of the state of the
economy in general. Id. at 739. It is unlikely that capital accumulation resulting from
other factors would be enough to offset the capital consumption caused by extremely
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light of the nature of capital,14 1 continued economic growth is strongly
influenced by the amount of capital available in society; increases in
capital levels are a strong indicator of economic growth. 14 2 Conversely,
declining levels of capital (e.g., capital consumption) have been linked to
"retrogressing economies." 43 Simply put, less capital limits production,
and, as a result, fewer goods and services from which income is derived
are created or generated.14 4 This string of economic causation, expressed
within the context of time, is indicative of economic decline.14 5 This
economic loss, however, is not limited to Pennsylvania's economy
because of the way in which capital is distributed. Much of the capital
owned by Pennsylvania residents, particularly capital assets in the form
of cash, cash deposits, and other liquid assets, is put to productive use
outside of Pennsylvania's borders.14 6 However, capital consumption of
Pennsylvanians' capital assets still has an economic effect within

high inheritance tax rates. See infra note 156 and accompanying text (noting the
importance of capital accumulation and consumption resulting from other economic
factors and the aggregate economic effect).
141. MISES, supra note 7, at 490-93, 514-17. See also supra notes 104-114 and
accompanying text (discussing the praxeological nature of capital).
142. ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 479-83.
143. Id. at 483-91. Rothbard notes that
The case of decreasing gross capital investment is defined as a retrogressing
economy. The decreased investment is first revealed as aggregate losses in the
economy, particularly losses to firms in the highest stages of production ....
As time proceeds, these losses will tend to disappear, as firms leave the
industry and abandon the now unprofitable production processes ....
... The greater the shift from saving to consumption, the more drastic will the
effects tend to be, and the greater the lowering of productivity and living
standards. The fact that such shifts can and do happen serves to refute easily
the fashionable assumption that our capital structure is, by some magical
provision or hidden hand, permanently and eternally self-reproducing once it is
built. No positive acts of saving by self-reproducing capitalists are deemed
necessary to maintain it. The ruins of Rome are mute illustrations of the error
of this assumption.
Refusal to maintain the value of capital, i.e., the process of net dissaving, is
known as consuming capital. Granting the impossibility of measuring the value
of capital in society with any precision, this is still a highly important concept.
"Consuming capital" means, of course, not "eating machines," as some critics
have scoffingly referred to it, but failing to maintain existing gross investment
and the existing capital goods structure, using some of these funds instead for
consumption expenditure.
Id. at 483-85.
144. Id.
145. MISES, supra note 7, at 514-17.
146. This fact is most apparent with regard to bank deposits and bonds, where banks
and bond issuers apply the funds collected to companies with operations around not only
the United States, but the world.
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Pennsylvania's borders because individuals oftentimes make capital
investments in their own localities. 14 7
Pennsylvania's inheritance tax rates, as currently provided in
statute,14 8 also have economic consequences similar to those of high
inheritance tax rates, albeit to a much lesser degree.14 9 Thus, the
structure of Pennsylvania's current inheritance tax also increases the rate
of ante-mortem capital consumption. 50 At current inheritance tax rates,
some individuals recognize the decreased satisfaction of providing
inheritances that will be smaller due to inheritance tax assessments.15 '
Some of these persons weigh the decreased satisfaction against the
opportunity cost of present consumption and conclude the latter to be a
more attractive option.15 2 However, given Pennsylvania's relatively low
inheritance tax rates and the correspondingly small effect on decreasing
the satisfaction of saving to provide inheritances, many people are not
put on the "margin" of whether to save and, thus, do save to leave
inheritances.'5 3 As a result, capital consumption under Pennsylvania's
current inheritance tax rate structure, while still present, is significantly
less than it would otherwise be if the Commonwealth imposed high
inheritance tax rates.
Although Pennsylvania's inheritance tax, even at current rates,
encourages some level of capital consumption, this alone has not created
Instead, Pennsylvania's
a shrinking economy in Pennsylvania.154
economic growth (or decline) incorporates, and will continue to
incorporate, numerous other variables as well, each of which is also a

147. Some of the best examples are sole proprietors, other small business owners,
credit unions, and small banks and financial institutions.
148. 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 9116(a) (West 2008). The current rates are zero percent for
property passed to spouses, four and one-half percent for property passed to grandparents,
parents, lineal descendants, or spouses of a child, twelve percent for property passed to
siblings, and fifteen percent for property passed to all other persons. Id.; see supra Part
II.B (describing the statutory contours of Pennsylvania's current inheritance tax).
149. See infra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 129-39 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
153. One interesting effect of Pennsylvania's current inheritance tax rate structure is
that one's evaluation of the satisfaction to be obtained from saving to provide
inheritances changes in relation to the expected beneficiaries. An individual who intends
to provide inheritances to siblings or other collaterals may conclude that he has much less
incentive to save, and subsequently does not save, because the inheritance he will provide
is taxed at twelve percent and fifteen percent, respectively. 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 9116(a)
(West 2008) (providing the tax rates for property inherited by siblings and collaterals).
154. See Pennsylvania Department of Revenue Bureau of Research, 2008-2009
Estimate Documentation 17-28 (2008), http://www.revenue.state.pa.us/revenue/lib/
revenue/2008_09_EstDoc.pdf (providing data showing Pennsylvania's economic
growth in recent years).
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function of individual human actions."'
These other factors may
encourage capital accumulation, unlike the inheritance tax, to such an
extent that the capital "consumed" as a result of the inheritance tax
would be offset, with a net economic effect of capital accumulation and
subsequent economic growth.156 Alternatively, if these other factors
were also to encourage capital consumption or were collectively unable
to promote a level of capital accumulation sufficient to exceed the capital
consumption resulting from the inheritance tax, the net economic effect
would be economic decline resulting from capital consumption."s'
Any consideration of the economic effects of repealing
Pennsylvania's inheritance tax must also be considered in the context of
this broader framework. Like House Bill 377, one of the most recent
examples, as of yet there have been several unsuccessful attempts to
phase out Pennsylvania's inheritance tax.' 58 House Bill 377, as well as
those other legislative proposals seeking to phase out the tax, 159 would
have considerable economic consequences, including the elimination of
all ante-mortem capital consumption resulting from the current
inheritance tax.16 0 Repealing the inheritance tax would remove the
artificial disincentive, recognized by some individuals, to saving for the
purpose of leaving inheritances for families, friends, and favored
causes.161 With the inheritance tax eliminated, those individuals who
would not have otherwise saved will begin putting aside assets that,
together with the assets from persons who would have saved despite the
inheritance tax, would result in greater capital accumulation.1 62 When
combined with the other factors affecting Pennsylvania's economy,1 63
this capital accumulation could further contribute to any capital
accumulation and economic growth or offset, either completely or

155. Some of the best such examples are economic productivity rates, the
development of new markets and industries, and Pennsylvania's ability to attract existing
business. Another factor is any capital accumulation that still occurs, in spite of the
inheritance tax, as people save to leave behind inheritances.
156. ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 339-46, 350-56.
157. Id.
158. See supra Part II.C and, in particular, note 56.
159. H.R. 1444, 190th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); H.R. 808, 190th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); H.R. 836, 190th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); S.
417, 190th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); and H.R. 409, 190th Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Pa. 2007).
160. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 129-39 and accompanying text.
162. MISES, supra note 7, at 490-93, 514-17. See also supra notes 104-14 and
accompanying text (discussing the praxeological nature of capital).
163. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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Ante-Mortem CapitalFlight

High inheritance tax rates would substantially increase the rate of
ante-mortem capital flight by also affecting individuals' subjective
evaluations of the perceived costs and benefits of remaining domiciled in
Pennsylvania and establishing domicile in another jurisdiction.165 The
legal concept of domicile plays a primary role in determining what
inherited property is taxed. 16 6 Under Pennsylvania law, intangible
property cannot be taxed if it is inherited from a decedent who was not
domiciled in Pennsylvania.167 The only property inherited from a nonPennsylvania resident that can be taxed is tangible property physically
located within the Commonwealth.16 8 Thus, persons with substantial
investments in intangible property could avoid having those assets taxed
when distributed to legatees or heirs by domiciling themselves in a state
without an inheritance tax.16 9
However, the decision of whether to establish domicile in another
state includes weighing the perceived costs of relocating with the
anticipated benefits reaped from avoiding Pennsylvania's inheritance
taxes, all within the context of one's individual value scale.170 Moving to
another state inherently incurs some costs, which at the very least include
the expense of physically transporting one's person and possessions to
another state and any increases in the cost of living resulting from the
relocation. Additionally, there may be the subjectively-determined
emotional costs of leaving behind one's hometown, moving away from
164. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 166-87 and accompanying text.
166. Domicile "is the place at which an individual has fixed his family home and
principal establishment for an indefinite period of time." In re Prendergast, 673 A.2d
324, 327 (Pa. 1996) (citing Dorrance's Estate, 163 A. 303 (Pa. 1932)). In continuing to
describe the concept, the court found that
[a] domicile once acquired is presumed to continue until it is shown to have
been changed and where a change is alleged, the burden of proving it rests
upon whoever makes the allegation. A new domicile can be acquired only by
physical presence at a new residence plus intent to make that new residence the
principal home. Intent is the actual state of facts, not what one declares them to
be. An established domicile, however, can be retained without physical
presence or residence until it be proven that a new domicile has been acquired.
Id. at 327-28 (citing Dorrance's Estate, 163 A. 303).
167. 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 9111(h) (West 2008).
168. Id. § 9107(a)-(b).
169. Other states, like Florida, are attractive jurisdictions in which to establish
domicile on account of their having large retirement communities, desirable weather, and
no inheritance taxes.
170. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
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family, friends, or a job, or having to reestablish oneself in a new
community.171 Individuals will weigh the sum of these subjective costs
against the anticipated benefits of establishing domicile in that state.
These anticipated benefits may include moving closer to family or
friends, to a warmer climate, or where employment is more easily found.
For some, the decision to relocate will also include a consideration
of the inheritance tax consequences. 172 Like the decision to save,17 3 an
individual will determine the anticipated present and future satisfaction
from providing inheritances under the Pennsylvania inheritance tax
regime and compare that estimate with the anticipated present and future
benefit of providing inheritances under the laws of the state to which he
plans to move.17 4 Inheritance tax rates necessarily affect this analysis by
altering the anticipated present and future satisfaction of saving to
provide inheritances, thus increasing the perceived benefits of
establishing domicile in a state with a lower inheritance tax rate.' 75 Were
Pennsylvania's inheritance tax rates to be increased to very high
levels,176 the anticipated benefits of relocating to a state with much
lower, if any, inheritance tax rates would increase dramatically. This
dramatic increase in the anticipated benefits of relocating would place
more individuals on the "margin" of the decision to establish domicile in
another state, thus strongly encouraging ante-mortem capital flight from
Pennsylvania. 177
171. This is far from an exhaustive list of the costs that a person might perceive in
moving to another state. Given the infinite uniqueness of individuals, the possibilities are
endless.
172. Not all people are concerned about the effect that inheritance taxes will have on
the future distributees who inherit their property. The concept of marginality, however,
ensures that there are those who would consider the effect of moving on the taxation of
inherited property. This is particularly true with regard to wealthy individuals and
persons consciously attempting to save with the goal of leaving behind a substantial
inheritable estate.
173. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
174. See generally supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text (describing the internal
process of individual decision-making based on subjective value judgments).
175. See supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text (concluding that high tax rates
significantly decrease the anticipated satisfaction from saving to provide inheritances).
176. See supra Part II.A.
177. Capital flight resulting from state inheritance or estate taxes was a not a problem
before the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA)
"decoupled" the federal estate tax from state inheritance or estate taxes by eliminating the
federal estate tax credit for state inheritance or estate taxes paid. Jeffrey A. Cooper,
Interstate Competition and State Death Taxes: A Modern Crisis in Historical
Perspective, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 835, 870-80 (2006). There is still some debate as to
whether capital flight actually occurs as a result of state inheritances and estate taxes. A
praxeological examination concludes that, necessarily, there will be those persons who
move to avoid state inheritance taxes.
See generally supra notes 96-103 and
accompanying text (discussing the concept of marginality). It also appears that many
states are convinced that inheritance taxes will have the effect of encouraging capital
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The nature of this cost-benefit analysis creates a situation, only
further exacerbated by high inheritance tax rates, in which wealthy
individuals will have a greater incentive to relocate than those of less
affluent means.178 First, it is far more likely that people who are wealthy
will incur fewer costs to establish domicile in another jurisdiction,
because many of these people may already have a secondary home in
another state. Establishing domicile in another state could mean
converting that secondary home into one's primary residence by merely
taking an extended "vacation" each year.179 Second, wealthy individuals
generally are more sensitive to inheritance tax consequences, as they are
more likely to be concerned with providing considerable inheritances and
asset protection.1so
For affluent individuals in particular, high
Pennsylvania inheritance tax rates would significantly increase the
benefits of relocating to other states, with the requisite effect on the
decision of whether to move.' 8 1
The most serious consequence 82 of capital flight away from
Pennsylvania is a decrease in incomel83 entering or generated within the
flight, as many states abandoned their inheritance or estate taxes after the passage of
EGTRRA. Cooper, supra, at 874-80. Additionally, other studies have concluded that
some level of capital flight does result from state inheritance and estate taxes. See Jon
Bakija and Joel Slemrod, Do the Rich Flee from High State Taxes?: Evidence from
FederalEstate Tax Returns (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10645,
2004) (finding that high state inheritance taxes have a statistically significant, modest
effect of encouraging capital flight). But see Elizabeth McNichol, Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities, Research Findings Cast Doubt on Argument That Estate Taxes Harm
State Economies (2007) http://www.cbpp.org/1-9-07sfp.pdf (summarizing research
arguing that state inheritance taxes do not cause capital flight and, subsequently, harm
state economies).
178. See infra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
179. Establishing domicile in another state could be as simple as registering one's
vehicle in another state or registering to vote and actually voting in another state. In re
Prendergast, 673 A.2d 324, 328 (Pa. 1996). In the context of owning two homes, one
will not be considered a domiciliary or resident individual of Pennsylvania if he does not
spend more than a total of 183 days a year in Pennsylvania. 72 PA. STAT. § 7301(p)
(West 2008).
180. Beyond being intuitive, briefly scanning through the contents of magazines
marketed to individuals with high net worth will establish this fact.
181. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
182. An additional consequence of the capital flight resulting from Pennsylvania's
inheritance tax is the loss of human capital. Avoiding Pennsylvania's inheritance tax
necessarily involves establishing domicile in another state, which has an obvious effect
on the size of Pennsylvania's workforce. This draining of human capital may be limited,
however, in that those more likely to relocate due to inheritance tax considerations (e.g.,
older Pennsylvanians) are also likely to be retired. Although this is probably the case,
there may be other economic consequences linked to general population loss. See
ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 505 (briefly describing some of the economic effects of
population growth).
183. The term "income," as used here refers to its common definition of money
received, which reflects the broad meaning given it by the Internal Revenue Service. 26
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Commonwealth. One of the primary features of capital assets is their
ability to generate income. 184 Not only is this true for "hard" capital
assets like land and industrial machinery, but it also applies to capital
assets like bank deposits, bonds, and stock.'8 5 The time value of money
necessitates that individuals who have allowed others to use their money
be compensated accordingly in the form of interest and dividends,8 6
which can add up to substantial amounts of income.187 High inheritance
tax rates encourage a proportionate level of capital flight, which, in turn,
has a commensurate effect on the amount of income brought into or
generated within Pennsylvania.
As Pennsylvania's inheritance tax is currently structured, it
encourages ante-mortem capital flight, although to a much lesser degree
than would high inheritance tax rates.' 88 Individuals make the decision
of whether to establish domicile in another state by weighing the costs of
relocating against the expected benefits. 89 The current inheritance tax
rates still increase, to some extent, the benefits one anticipates from
relocating by providing a way to avoid Pennsylvania inheritance taxes.190
This is particularly true for two categories of individuals: 1) affluent
persons whose future estates will retain a significant amount of assets in
another state'91 and 2) persons who plan to leave their estates to siblings

U.S.C.A. § 61 (West 2008). In its specific, praxeological sense, "income" refers to a
much more specific category of property. MISES, supra note 7, at 260-64.
184. ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 298-301, 319-22 (referring to this income as
interest, a term with a specific praxeological definition that differs from the definition of
the Internal Revenue Service).
185. Id.
186. Dividends from stock fall into this category as a result of the nature of stock. At
some point in the past, a share of stock was issued in exchange for money that was to be
used by the issuer. In return, the stock purchaser received a residual right to the income
generated by the issuer and distributed in the form of dividends. Selling stock necessarily
includes selling this residual right to income and, thus, is similar to selling one's interest
in a note or other debt instrument.
187. ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 298-301, 319-22 (referring to this income as
interest, a term with a specific praxeological definition that differs from the definition of
the Internal Revenue Service).
188. See infra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
191. For example, if Anne plans to leave an estate of $1,000,000 in cash and stock to
her children, her estate will realize inheritance tax savings of $45,000 if she establishes
domicile in a state that does not levy an inheritance tax. On the other hand, if Bob plans
to leave an estate of $250,000 in cash and stock to his children, his estate will realize
inheritance tax savings of $11,250 if he relocates to a state without an inheritance tax.
Assuming that both Anne and Bob recognize an equivalent level of costs in moving from
Pennsylvania and that they have substantially similar attitudes towards money and the
nature of inheritances, Anne will be much more inclined to move, because the benefits of
doing so would be higher for her. Furthermore, the perceived benefits of relocating
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or collaterals.19 2 These people are more likely to establish domicile in
another state, which results in a mild' 9 3 level of capital flight and its
corresponding economic effects, namely a decrease in the amount of
income in the form of interest and dividends realized in Pennsylvania.
Because some capital flight occurs as a result of Pennsylvania's
current inheritance tax, repealing the Commonwealth's inheritance tax
would decrease ante-mortem capital flight. Without the artificial
incentive created by the possibility of relocating to avoid Pennsylvania's
inheritance tax, 19 4 more people would be constrained by their subjective
evaluations of the costs associated with moving. As a result, many
people, their capital assets, and the income those capital assets would
generate would remain in Pennsylvania.
C.

Post-Mortem CapitalConsumption

High inheritance tax rates would considerably increase post-mortem
capital consumption by requiring the liquidation of considerable amounts
of capital assets to pay inheritance tax assessments.' 95 Necessarily, cash
must be raised to pay inheritance tax assessments; Pennsylvania does not
accept other forms of property as payment. 19 6 If enough cash is not
readily available, capital assets like stock, bonds, and real property may
have to be sold to raise the needed funds. After being collected by the
Pennsylvania Department of Revenue, these funds are added to the
Commonwealth's treasury, with much smaller amounts, if any, being
converted, once again, into capital assets owned by the state.197
The fact that another party purchases the capital assets being sold
and, as a result, those capital assets continue to exist and retain their

would be even more considerable for individuals planning to leave estates significantly
exceeding the $1,000,000 estate used in this scenario.
192. For example, if Anne plans to leave an estate of $1,000,000 in cash and stock to
her great-nephew, with whom she is very close, her estate will realize inheritance tax
savings of $150,500 if she establishes domicile in a state that has no inheritance tax. If
Bob, however, plans to leave an estate of $1,000,000 in cash and stock to his daughter,
his estate will realize inheritance tax savings of $45,000 if he moves to a state without an
inheritance tax. Once again, Anne will be much more inclined to move, because the
benefits of doing so would be considerably higher for her. See supra note 191 (using
same methodology and similar scenario to come to a similar conclusion).
193. The encouragement of capital flight is "mild" under the current inheritance tax
regime in comparison with what it would be with an inheritance tax that imposed high
rates.
194. See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
195. See infra notes 196-206 and accompanying text.
196. 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 9136 (West 2008).
197. Under a praxeological analysis, it is necessarily impossible for governments to
replace the level of savings and investment that would have occurred through private
decision-making. RoTHBARD, supra note 6, at 815-3 1.
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character as such198 does not controvert the praxeological conclusion that
an increase in capital consumption occurs as well. To purchase these
capital assets, another individual or entity would have to expend assets
that were already contributing to the total amount of capital assets
already integrated into the market.1 99 Withdrawing significant funds
from one's accounts at a financial institution 20 0 has the effect of
increasing capital consumption 20' by diverting funds that have already
been infused into the capital market in the form of loans and bond
purchases from the financial institution.20 2 The result is a decrease in
total capital, or capital consumption, proportionate to the amount
necessary to satisfy an inheritance tax assessment.

For this same reason, using one's own funds to pay inheritance
taxes and, thus, avoiding having to sell capital assets still results in
203
To make the necessary payments, funds will be
capital consumption.
withdrawn from accounts at financial institutions, which had previously
injected at least a significant portion of those funds into the capital

198. There is no guarantee that a purchased capital asset will retain that character
while under the ownership of the purchaser. For example, it is possible that a purchaser
may convert real property previously rented for business use to private apartments.
Assuming that capital assets will not be converted is useful only for the sake of argument.
199. The only exception to this principle is where an individual is able to pay for the
property being sold solely with hoarded cash. Hoarded funds, by definition, are never
deposited with financial institutions that would then feed those funds into the capital
market. Still, however, hoarded cash plays a praxeologically significant economic role.
MISES, supra note 7, at 521-23.

200. For capital consumption to occur, it is unnecessary that the actual purchaser of
the assets being sold to pay for inheritance taxes withdraw the necessary funds from his
bank. Rather, only one or several persons indirectly related to the transaction need to
take funds from their accounts at financial institutions for the effect to be capital
consumption. For example, if Anne wishes to purchase a portion of a sole proprietorship
that is being sold to satisfy the inheritance taxes of the deceased sole proprietor, she will
have to sell stocks that she has held to raise the necessary funds. Although Anne is
selling stock and, therefore, is not withdrawing funds from a financial institution, the
purchaser/s of her stock (or other individuals or entities in the chain) will need to
withdraw funds in order to make the necessary payment. Thus, the effect on the
availability of capital is the same as if Anne herself had withdrawn the amounts needed
for the purchase.
201. An increase in capital consumption will occur as a result except where the
withdrawn funds are used to fund the production of capital assets that were not previously
existing or used as capital assets.
202. Not only is this one of the primary functions of financial institutions, but it is
also one of their principal means of generating revenue. Reserve rates do not avoid this
capital consumption, because as deposits are withdrawn, reserve rates would also
decrease.
203. The only general exception to this rule is when hoarded cash is used. See supra
note 199.
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market.20 4 Not having to withdraw funds from a bank, but being able to
pay an inheritance tax assessment with insurance proceeds is also
ineffective in avoiding capital consumption; on a macro-level, insurance
companies function in ways very similar to banks and other financial
institutions. 205 Therefore, funds that would be put into the capital market
by insurance companies 206 would instead be diverted to satisfy
Pennsylvania inheritance taxes. Post-mortem capital consumption would
be significant under high inheritance tax rates, as relatively more capital
assets would need to be liquidated to meet the Commonwealth's tax
assessments.
Pennsylvania's current inheritance tax causes post-mortem capital
consumption. Even at current, relatively low rates, the inheritance tax
diverts funds from the capital market. 207 The inheritance tax and the
requirement that assessments be satisfied with cash forces individuals to
pay with saved funds or liquidate other assets. 2 0 8 These saved funds
were previously injected into the capital markets by the financial
institutions with which they were deposited. 2 0 9 Likewise, many of the
liquidated assets will be capital assets purchased by another with saved
funds, which also has the effect of drawing capital out of the market.2 10
Although the effect of the Pennsylvania inheritance tax, as currently in
statute, is to encourage capital consumption, the overall economic
vitality of the Commonwealth depends on how the capital consumption
is geographically distributed2 1 1 and the role played by other economic
variables.212
Repealing Pennsylvania's inheritance tax would eliminate the postmortem capital consumption that results from the inheritance tax. 213
204. See generally MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE MYSTERY OF BANKING (2d ed. The
Ludwig von Mises Inst. 2008) (discussing the economic role played by banks and
financial institutions).
205. Id.
206. For many individuals, a primary incentive to purchase life insurance would be
altered or even eliminated with certain changes to or a repeal of the Pennsylvania
inheritance tax. In such situations, at least a portion of the money that comprises
premiums paid to insurance companies would be directly converted into capital assets or
indirectly injected into the capital market by being deposited into a bank or other
financial institution.
207. See generally supra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
208. 72 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9136-9154 (West 2008).
209. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
211. MISES, supra note 7, at 513, 517-20. Regardless of how the capital consumption
is specifically distributed, there will virtually always be a significant effect within
Pennsylvania itself. See supra note 155 (providing several reasons as to why the capital
consumption resulting from an inheritance tax will affect the state that levies it).
212. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
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With no reason to artificially expend saved funds or liquidate other
capital assets to pay an inheritance tax assessment, these assets would
remain available to the capital market to be put to productive use.2 14
Capital would not be diverted from the capital market, unlike under the
current regime, and, as a result, no capital consumption would be caused
by inheritance taxes.
D.

State Revenue

High inheritance tax rates would significantly increase state revenue
in the short term, but would also have the opposite long term effect of
rapidly decreasing state revenue.215 It is apparent that high inheritance
tax rates would increase state revenue to a substantial degree in the short
term.216 However, state revenue would likely decline in the long term as
individuals responded to those high inheritance tax rates. 217 Rapidly
declining state revenue would result from high inheritance taxes and their
effect on ante-mortem capital consumption, ante-mortem capital flight,
and post-mortem capital consumption.2 18 Capital flight creates a
situation where money from which taxable income (in the form of
interest and dividends) is derived is indirectly pushed to other states that
do not levy an inheritance tax.21 9 Likewise, capital consumption,
whether ante-mortem or post-mortem, eliminates a direct source of
taxable income by "consuming" these same forms of income-generating
capital assets. 22 0 Additionally, as capital assets used for productive use
became unavailable, production would decrease, with a subsequent
decline in other, related tax revenues, such as income taxes, excise taxes,
sales taxes. In light of the severe consequences that high inheritance tax
rates would have on capital flight and capital consumption, the effect on
the decline in state revenues would be correspondingly severe.
Pennsylvania's current inheritance tax provides comparatively little
state revenue. During Pennsylvania's 2007-2008 budget year, the
214. See supra notes 198-206 and accompanying text.
215. See infra notes 216-20 and accompanying text. Praxeology rejects the notion
that governments have the potential to spur economic growth at rates greater than
individuals in an unhampered market economy. See MISES, supra note 7, at 698-858;
ROTHBARD, supra note 6, at 765-878.
216. This simply results from the fact that higher tax rates generate more revenue in
the short term by taxing a higher proportion of income or assets.
217. But see Jon Bakija and Joel Slemrod, Do the Rich Fleefrom High State Taxes?:
Evidence from FederalEstate Tax Returns (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 10645, 2004) (concluding that declines in revenue would not occur as a result
of capital flight).
218. See supra Part IV.A-C and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 134-47, 195-206 and accompanying text.
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inheritance tax raised $801,200,000 for the Commonwealth's coffers.2 2'
However, with total state revenue of $28,188,100,000, the amount
generated by the inheritance tax represented only 2.8% of Pennsylvania's
budget.2 2 2 Additionally, the percentage of the state's budget raised by
the inheritance tax has decreased from nearly 3.4% since the 2002-2003
budget year.223 Likewise, even at current tax rates, Pennsylvania's
inheritance tax causes some level of capital consumption and capital
flight.224 This decreases the amount of taxable income and production
generated from capital not only in the present, but into the future as

221. Pennsylvania Department of Revenue Bureau of Research, 2008-2009 Estimate
Documentation 1 (2008), http://www.revenue.state.pa.us/revenue/lib/revenue/2008
09_EstDoc.pdf.
222. Id.
223. The amount of revenue raised by the inheritance tax, the Commonwealth's total
budget, and the percentage of that total budget constituted by the inheritance tax is
provided in the following chart for tax years 2002-2003 through 2007-2008:
INHERITANCE TAX REVENUE AS A PERCENTAGE OF PENNSYLVANIA'S
BUDGET
Inheritance Tax as a
State Budget
Inheritance Tax
Budget Year
Percentage of State
Revenue
Budget
2.8%
$28,188,100,000
$801,200,000
2007-2008
2.7%
$26,866,200,000
2006-2007
$738,200,000
2005-2006
$725,500,000
$25,252,600,000
2.9%
2004-2005
$719,300,000
$24,157,400,000
3.0%
2003-2004
$704,300,000
$22,191,300,000
3.2%
2002-2003
$715,700,000
$21,206,000,000
3.4%
Data compiled from: Pennsylvania Department of Revenue Bureau of Research, 20082009 Estimate Documentation 1 (2008), http://www.revenue.state.pa.us/revenue/lib/
revenue/2008_09_Est Doc.pdf; Pennsylvania Department of Revenue Bureau of
Research, 2007-2008 Estimate Documentation 1 (2007), http://www.revenue.state.pa.us/
revenue/lib/revenue/2007_08_EstDoc.pdf; Pennsylvania Department of Revenue
Bureau of Research, 2006-2007 Estimate Documentation 1 (2006), http://www.revenue.
state.pa.us/revenue/lib/revenue/2006_07_Est Doc.pdf; Pennsylvania Department of
Revenue Bureau of Research, 2005-2006 Estimate Documentation 1 (2005),
http://www.revenue.state.pa.us/revenue/lib/revenue/2005_06_EstDoc.pdf, Pennsylvania
Department of Revenue Bureau of Research, 2004-2005 Estimate Documentation 1
(2004),
http://www.revenue.state.pa.us/revenue/lib/revenue/2004_05_Est Doc.pdf,
Pennsylvania Department of Revenue Bureau of Research, 2003-2004 Estimate
Documentation 1 (2003), http://www.revenue.state.pa.us/revenue/lib/revenue/2003 04
EstDoc.pdf.
It is interesting to note, however, that the Department of Revenue estimates that the
percentage of Pennsylvania's budget derived from the inheritance tax will increase for the
next five budget years. Pennsylvania Department of Revenue Bureau of Research, 20082009 Estimate Documentation 1 (2008), http://www.revenue.state.pa.us/revenuelib/
revenue/2008_09_EstDoc.pdf.
224. See supra notes 148-57, 188-93, 207-12 and accompanying text.
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well. 22 5 Depending upon other economic variables, 226 the progressive
decrease in capital levels resulting from capital flight and direct taxation
has the potential to decrease the Commonwealth's revenue in the long
term. 227
Conversely, repealing Pennsylvania's inheritance tax would
decrease state revenue in the short term, but would maintain the state's
tax base and has the contingent potential to increase state revenue or
offset other revenue losses in the long term. Without the capital flight
and capital consumption encouraged by Pennsylvania's inheritance
228
income and production generated from capital that would
tax,
otherwise not be available would be added to sources of current tax
revenues. Furthermore, a portion of this income and production would
likely be added to the stock of available capital, further increasing
Pennsylvania's future tax base. Similarly, if other economic variables
were to cause a depletion of Pennsylvania's capital levels, the amounts
contributed as a result of repealing the state's inheritance tax would
offset some or all of this other capital consumption.2 29
V.

BEYOND PRAXEOLOGY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEBATE

Praxeology's purpose is primarily educational; it seeks to inform
individuals about the economic consequences of their actions and the
policies of larger social collectives such as states, businesses,
organizations.23 0 With this information, people are able to apply their
value judgments to the economic consequences of varying public policy
options.
Furthermore, praxeological insight enables individuals to
225. Each year, as less capital is available with which to generate income and
production, Pennsylvania's tax base will contract. This process, year after year, when
combined with subsequent increases in taxes to compensate for budget shortfalls, will
create a situation primed for economic decline.
226. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
227. But see MISES, supra note 7, at 740-41 (indicating that it is possible for a tax at
certain rates to not impair economic growth in stating that "[clapital levies, inheritance
and estate taxes, and income taxes are . . . self-defeating if carried to extremes"). Mises
concluded the following:
Businessmen complain about the oppressiveness of heavy taxes. Statesmen are
alarmed about the danger of "eating the seedcom." Yet, the true crux of the
taxation issue is to be seen in the paradox that the more taxes increase, the more
they undermine the market economy and concomitantly the system of taxation
itself. Thus the fact becomes manifest that ultimately the preservation of
private property and confiscatory measures are incompatible. Every specific
tax, as well as a nation's whole tax system, becomes self-defeating above a
certain height of the rates.
Id. at 741.
228. See supra notes 158-64, 194, 213-14 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
230. MISES, supra note 7, at 10.
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compare policies with competing evaluations from an economic
perspective.
With regard to Pennsylvania's inheritance tax, praxeology supports
the conclusion that high inheritance tax rates would cause significant
economic decline by fostering both capital consumption and capital
flight, with a secondary effect being a decline in state revenue.23 1
Likewise, under a praxeological examination, the Commonwealth's
current inheritance tax causes some capital consumption and capital
flight, albeit at levels insufficient to have presently created economic
decline in Pennsylvania.2 32 Repealing Pennsylvania's inheritance tax
would foster additional economic growth through the increase of capital
accumulation and a decrease in capital flight, which could have the
contingent potential of increasing state revenue in the long term.233 In
terms of the debate over the Pennsylvania inheritance tax,234 the key
praxeological insight is that the tax does not encourage economic
growth. 2 3 5 Rather, Pennsylvania's inheritance tax is something of a
hindrance to economic expansion.236
These praxeological conclusions have profound implications for the
debate over the Pennsylvania inheritance tax. First, advocates of the tax
should 2 37 not argue that it generates economic growth for the
Commonwealth. 23 8 This is not to say that it does not generate positive
economic benefits 23 9 for Pennsylvania; depending on one's normative
values, economic decline or maintaining a certain level of production or
standard of living may be a more ethical option. 24 0 These conclusions
relate to praxeology's second implication with regard to Pennsylvania's
inheritance tax debate: proponents of the inheritance tax would do well

231. See supra notes 134-47, 165, 176-81, 195-206, 215-20 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 148-57, 188-93, 207-12, 221-27 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 158-64, 194, 213-14, 228-29 and accompanying text.
234. See The General Assembly of Pennsylvania, Legislative Journal-House 83
(January 16, 2008), http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01I/LI/HJ/2008/0/20080116.pdf
(providing evidence of the debate).
235. See supra Part IV.
236. See supra Part IV.
237. This is a normative conclusion that stands outside the realm of praxeological
analysis. Rather, it assumes and applies the value judgment that honesty is important in
open and meaningful discussion and debate.
238. See supra Part IV (analyzing Pennsylvania's inheritance tax and discussing its
economic effects).
239. The word "benefit" implies a value judgment that is distinct from the descriptive
facts of economic growth or decline.
240. See supra note 112 (mentioning article by Richard Douthwaite questioning the
benefits of economic growth).
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to focus their energy and resources on arguments about the noneconomic benefits of the inheritance tax. 241
VI. CONCLUSION
For the purposes of analysis, Pennsylvania's inheritance tax, the
oldest in the nation,242 can be examined in three different formulations:
1) an inheritance tax that imposes a high tax rate, 2) a graduated
inheritance tax, as currently in state, with lower tax rates, and 3) an
inheritance tax that has been repealed or is ineffective.243 The first of
these formulations is theoretically possible due to the lack of clear,
unambiguous limitations on the power of the Commonwealth to tax
inherited property or the right of succession. 244
Pennsylvania's
inheritance tax, as actually codified in statute,245 provides the second of
these formulations.246 The third formulation has not yet been realized,
247
despite numerous attempts to repeal the inheritance tax.
Praxeology, as the study of human action, is appropriately suited for
economic analysis of Pennsylvania's inheritance tax and its economic
consequences. 2 48 The Commonwealth's inheritance tax is an economic
variable that some individuals will consider in their decision-making
processes. 2 4 9 Thus, when the praxeologically-derived principles of
means, ends, value scales, time preferences, and marginality are
employed as tools of analysis,250 the inheritance tax, in each of its three
formulations, is shown to affect four praxeologically-significant
categories of economic factors: ante-mortem capital consumption, antemortem capital flight, post-mortem capital consumption, and state

revenue. 2 5 1

241. One such popular example is the argument that the inheritance tax is necessary
to protect or enhance the meritocratic nature of Pennsylvania and the United States or to
maximize state revenue in the short term.
242. 1825-26 Pa. Laws 227-30.
243. See supra Part II.
244. See supra Part II.A. See, e.g., Carpenter,58 U.S. at 456; In re Estate of Lander,
207 A.2d 753 (Pa. 1965); In re Estate of Pickering, 190 A.2d 132 (Pa. 1963); In re Estate
of Wright, 138 A.2d 102 (Pa. 1958); In re Tack's Estate, 191 A. 155 (Pa. 1937); Shugars,
130 A. at 426; In re Kirkpatrick's Estate, 119 A. 269 (Pa. 1922); Strode, 1866 WL 6214.
245. 72 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9101-9196 (West 2008).
246. See supra Part II.B.
247. See supra Part II.C. See, e.g., H.R. 1444, 190th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa.
2007); H.R. 808, 190th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); H.R. 836, 190th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); S. 417, 190th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); and
H.R. 409, 190th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007).
248. See supra Parts III-IV.
249.

See supra Parts III-IV.

250.
251.

See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.
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Were Pennsylvania's General Assembly to increase the inheritance
tax rates to high levels, the Commonwealth would be faced with severe
economic consequences. High inheritance tax rates would alter the value
scales of many individuals, leading some of these individuals to save and
invest less, with the end result being increased capital consumption.25 2
Likewise, for some individuals, high inheritance tax rates would decrease
the opportunity cost of establishing domicile in a state that assesses the
tax at a lower rate or does not impose an inheritance tax.253 This capital
flight would take with it much of the income and production that would
otherwise be generated as a result of capital investment.2 54 Furthermore,
high inheritance tax rates would cause post-mortem capital flight, as
larger amounts of capital assets would need to be liquidated to pay
inheritance tax assessments.255 As a result of these economic trends,
state revenue would increase substantially in the short term, but would
decrease in the long term.25 6
As the Commonwealth's inheritance tax is currently structured,
ante-mortem capital consumption, capital flight, and post-mortem capital
consumption also occur, although to a much lesser degree than would
result from the imposition of high inheritance tax rates.257 However, due
to other economic variables that affect rates of capital consumption and
capital flight, Pennsylvania's economy has not contracted.2 58 Despite the
state's economic growth, the loss of capital resulting from
Pennsylvania's inheritance tax could, contingent upon other economic
factors, decrease the tax base over the long term, thus depleting future
sources of state revenue.2 59
Repealing Pennsylvania's inheritance tax would eliminate the
capital consumption and capital flight the tax currently encourages.260
This would increase capital accumulation within the Commonwealth or
offset other sources of capital consumption, which could significantly
expand Pennsylvania's tax base and, thus, generate more state revenue
over the long term.26 1
As a descriptive rather than a normative system of analysis,
praxeology does not necessitate that a particular course of action be

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

See supra notes 134-47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 195-206 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 215-20 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 148-57, 188-93, 207-12 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 221-27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 158-64, 194, 213-14 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 154-64, 194, 213-14, 228-29 and accompanying text.
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taken or advocate for any public policies.262 To do so would require the
application of value judgments that lie beyond the scope of
praxeology.2 63 Praxeology's only function is educational; praxeology
seeks to provide insight into the economic consequences of both
individual and public policy choices. 264 With this knowledge, options
can be better understood and evaluated.2 65 Praxeology's key insight with
regard to Pennsylvania's inheritance tax is that the tax does not
encourage economic expansion.26 6 This fact, however, should be
dispositive only if the values reflected in Pennsylvania law are intended
to encourage economic growth as the primary end of state policy. 2 67
Alternatively, other normative conclusions may weigh in favor of the
inheritance tax.268 Despite the vital informational role of praxeological
economics, public policy considerations, like the debate over
Pennsylvania's inheritance tax, are inherently matters of normative value
that must be discussed, examined, and decided in the public sphere.

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

See supra Part Ill.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
See supra Parts III, V.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part V and, in particular, note 241.

